

# NetCease Tool

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/advanced-threat-analytics>

# 1 Overview

Reconnaissance (recon for short) is a key stage within the Advanced Attackers kill chain. Once attackers have breached a single end-point, they need to discover their next targets within the victim's corporate network, most notably privileged users.

Once attackers had "zoomed in" on target users, they need to find out the computers they had logon to, in order to propagate to them and compromise their credentials. Applying the SMB Session enumeration via the NetSessionEnum method against the DC (or other file servers), allows the attackers to get that information. Recently, some frameworks (e.g. BloodHound<sup>2</sup>) have automated that mapping process.

By default, NetSessionEnum method can be executed by any authenticated user, including network connected users, which effectively means that any domain user is able to execute it remotely.

Since the only current method to modify the default permissions for NetSessionEnum is by manually editing hex registry entry, we wrote the "NetCease" tool, a short PowerShell (PS) script which alters these default permissions. This hardening process should block attackers from easily getting valuable recon information.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://github.com/adaptivethreat/BloodHound>

## 2 Net Session Enumeration

Net Session Enumeration is a method used to retrieve information about established sessions on a server. Any domain user can query a server for its established sessions and get the following information:

- The name/IP address of the computer.
- The name of the user who established the session.
- The number of seconds the session has been active. (since the query)
- The number of seconds the session has been idle. (since the query)

Since all domain users/computers are updating their Group Policy approximately every 90 minutes, they establish a session to the DC and query for an update. Those sessions are visible to all domain users using the NetSessionEnum on that DC.<sup>3</sup>

Several widely-available tools implement such query, including the NetSess tool

```
C:\Research\NetSess>NetSess.exe dc1
NetSess V02.00.00cpp Joe Richards <joe@joeware.net> January 2004
Enumerating Host: dc1
Client          User Name          Time          Idle Time
-----
\\\\192.168.0.10  user1              000:00:13    000:00:00
\\\\192.168.0.4   CLIENT4-PC$       000:01:11    000:01:00
\\\\[::1]         DC1$              000:00:02    000:00:02
\\\\192.168.0.4   Administrator      000:00:02    000:00:02
Total of 4 entries enumerated
```

Figure 1: NetSess tool result example.

Microsoft ATA<sup>4</sup> detects the use of such query and alerts the security administrator about it


<sup>3</sup><https://microsoft.sharepoint.com/teams/Aorato/Shared%20Documents/Research/NTLM/Revealing%20NTLM%20Authenticated%20User%20using%20NetSess.docx?d=weba80c33af934227b2c1c72203baf64c>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/advanced-threat-analytics>

**Reconnaissance using SMB Session Enumeration**  
SMB session enumeration attempts were successfully performed from USER1-PC against DC1, exposing 4 accounts.

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**Session Enumeration**



**Exposed Accounts (4)**

- SECRETS-DBS  
on 192.168.0.210
- user1  
on 192.168.0.1
- APP2\$  
on 192.168.0.5
- user2  
on 192.168.0.5

**Recommendations**

- Disconnect USER1-PC from the network, or move it into an isolated environment and start a forensics procedure by investigating: unknown processes, services, registry entries, unsigned files, and more
- Verify that all enumerated accounts use a strong password.

Figure 2 MicrosoftATA alert on NetSessionEnum use

### 3 NetSessionEnum permissions

NetSessionEnum method permissions are controlled by a registry key under the following path:

*HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\DefaultSecurity\SrvsvcSessionInfo*




Figure 3 NetSessionEnum DACL in Registry

By default, this binary SrvsvcSessionInfo value is a Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) containing 4 Access Control Entries (ACE) which allows access to any user with at least one of the following characteristics:

- Member of Administrators group (Security Identifier (Sid) S-1-5-32-544)
- Member of Server Operators group (Sid S-1-5-32-549)
- Member of Power Users group (Sid S-1-5-32-547)
- Last but not least Authenticated Users group (Sid S-1-5-11)

By performing a successful network authentication against a domain joined machine, the users (or attackers) obtain the permission to execute NetSessionEnum on that machine, as they got the "Authenticated Users" Sid added to their authentication context.

## 4 NetCease details

The NetCease script hardens the access to the NetSessionEnum method by removing the execute permission for Authenticated Users group and adding permissions for interactive, service and batch logon sessions.

This will allow any administrator, system operator and power user to remotely call this method, and any interactive/service/batch logon session to call it locally.

Calling NetSess on a hardened machine from remote, using an administrator account:

```
C:\Research\NetSess>whoami
domain1\administrator

C:\Research\NetSess>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter External:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::7844:c6cf:6b6f:be70%13
    IPv4 Address. . . . .             : 192.168.0.10
    Subnet Mask . . . . .            : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . .        : 192.168.0.200

Ethernet adapter Internal:

    Media State . . . . .            : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter Local Area Connection* 11:

    Media State . . . . .            : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.<248B11C4-0755-45DB-AFDA-881053CE524B>:

    Media State . . . . .            : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Research\NetSess>NetSess.exe 192.168.0.4

NetSess V02.00.00cpp Joe Richards (joe@joeware.net) January 2004

Enumerating Host: 192.168.0.4
Client          User Name          Time          Idle Time
-----
\\.\192.168.0.10 Administrator      000:00:00     000:00:00

Total of 1 entries enumerated
```

Figure 4: Administrator successfully calls NetSess from remote on a hardened machine

Calling NetSess on a hardened machine from remote, using non privileged user:

```
C:\Research\NetSess>whoami
domain1\user1

C:\Research\NetSess>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter External:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::7844:c6cf:6b6f:be70%13
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.0.10
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.0.200

Ethernet adapter Internal:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter Local Area Connection* 11:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{248B11C4-0755-45DB-AFDA-881053CE524B}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Research\NetSess>NetSess.exe 192.168.0.4

NetSess U02.00.00cpp Joe Richards <joe@joeware.net> January 2004
Enumerating Host: 192.168.0.4
Client          User Name          Time          Idle Time
-----
Error: NetSessionEnum <5> Access is denied.
Total of 0 entries enumerated
```

Figure 5: User1 (non-admin) get access denied calling NetSess remotely

Calling NetSess on the same hardened machine, using the same user but locally:

```
C:\Tools\NetSess>whoami
domain1\user1

C:\Tools\NetSess>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet 2:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::4f4:876d:aa5e:55f4%2
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.0.4
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.0.200

Ethernet adapter Ethernet 3:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : corp.microsoft.com

Tunnel adapter isatap.{21A97DB5-6FE0-48D4-A6D9-C7E7C47BD282}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Tools\NetSess>NetSess.exe 192.168.0.4

NetSess V02.00.00cpp Joe Richards (joe@joeware.net) January 2004


Enumerating Host: 192.168.0.4
Client                User Name                Time                Idle Time
-----
\\.\192.168.0.4       user1                    000:00:00          000:00:00

Total of 1 entries enumerated
```

Figure 6: User1 (non-admin) successfully calls NetSess locally

## 5 Using NetCease.ps1


NetCease is simple to use. Run the PowerShell script as administrator on the machine you wish to harden (DC in most cases). In order for the changes to take effect, restart the "Server" service.



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Research\Tools> .\NetCease.ps1
NetCease 1.02 by Itai Grady (@ItaiGrady), Microsoft Advance Threat Analytics (ATA) Research Team, 2016
Permissions successfully updated
In order for the hardening to take effect, please restart the Server service
PS C:\Research\Tools>
```

Figure 7. \NetCease.ps1 execution

Note that hardening NetSession and hindering attackers' ability to abuse it, does not damage defenders' ability to detect the attack, as MicrosoftATA detects failed recon attempts as well



**Reconnaissance using SMB Session Enumeration**  
SMB session enumeration attempts failed by user1, from CLIENT2-PC against DC1. No accounts were exposed.

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Is running scanning tools allowed from the computer listed below?

user1 → On → CLIENT2-PC → Session Enumeration → DC1

**Computers (1)** No  Yes

CLIENT2-PC

Save Cancel

Once saved, this suspicious activity might be dismissed

**Recommendations**


- Disconnect CLIENT2-PC from the network, or move it into an isolated environment and start a forensics procedure by investigating: unknown processes, services, registry entries, unsigned files, and more

Figure 8 MicrosoftATA detection of a failed NetSessionEnum recon attempt

## 5.1 Revert Option

To revert changes done by the NetCease tool, use the Revert option. Registry value will be set to the backed up value.

For example:



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Research\Tools> .\NetCease.ps1 -Revert
NetCease 1.02 by Itai Grady (@ItaiGrady), Microsoft Advance Threat Analytics (ATA) Research Team, 2016
Reverting changes...
Revert completed
In order for the reverting to take effect, please restart the Server service
PS C:\Research\Tools> _
```

Figure 9. \NetCease.ps1 -Revert